After Florida kicked a field goal to close the Kentucky lead to 20-13, the Wildcats took over with 6:23 left in the fourth quarter. Chris Rodriguez then ran for 7 yards on first down, followed by a 1-yard run on second down setting up a third-and-2 with 4:47 left.
Will Levis had thrown for 87 yards at that point. He had completed only 44 percent of his throws. Rodriguez was averaging 5.2 yards per carry. So of course, Mark Stoops decided to go hard play-action and put the ball in Levis’ hands.
Kentucky did not convert that third down. Levis was pressured and threw the ball inaccurately. But the fact that Stoops – and offensive coordinator Liam Coen – decided to put the ball in Levis’ hands said everything you needed to know about this game. Stoops was there to win.
The same can’t be said for Gators coach Dan Mullen.
He can blame penalties and point to the yardage advantage at the end of the game over Kentucky as signs that he wasn’t outcoached, but he was given multiple opportunities to show faith in his players and give them a better chance at winning the game, and he chose not to.
What’s left is a season that outside of some major miracles is going to fall well short of the Gator Standard. And that my friends, is why Dan Mullen gets this week’s Kirby Award in a landslide.
Coaching Malpractice
I started the Kirby Awards as a tongue-in-cheek homage to Kirby Smart, but after this performance against Kentucky, we might need to rename it.
I see your Kirby and raise you a Mullengan
— LongTimeGator77 (@LGator77) October 3, 2021
Mullen’s first bad decision isn’t one anybody probably remembers because it was on the opening drive. The drive started with an offsides call on Kentucky, a 4-yard run by Emory Jones, then consecutive 18 and 7-yard passes to Trent Whittemore to set up second-and-3 at the Kentucky 41.
Malik Davis was then dropped for a 3-yard loss and on third-and-6, this is the playcall.
I’m actually okay with this play call. Florida obviously runs this play a lot. What I wasn’t okay with is that it set up a fourth-and-2 from the Kentucky 42-yard line and Mullen decided to punt.
This is clearly the wrong decision.
Regardless of where you go for your analytics, this is right in the sweet zone of where a coach gains more points for his team than he loses by going for it. Conversion rates are high (80+ percent) and the risk of turning the ball over on downs is limited considering that you probably only gain 20-30 yards of field position with a punt.
Indeed, that’s what happened as Jeremy Crawshaw put his punt into the end zone and Florida netted 22 yards on the decision to punt, but turned down an opportunity to score points in exchange for those yards.
The next incidence of questionable coaching came after a third-and-10 play that set up Florida’s field goal to go up 10-7. The try was successful, but the process to get there was incredibly flawed.
This play actually shows fantastic attention to detail by the Kentucky coaches. They have seen that Florida likes rolling Emory Jones to his right and limiting his reads, especially on third-and-long. So they have the safety bail to the middle of the field making Florida think they have one-on-one to the outside. But Kentucky also drops its linebacker into coverage, meaning Jones has nowhere to go with the ball.
But that’s not the coaching thing that I take exception with. I can’t tell by this view – I thought it watching live and so did the announcers – but it looks like this is a terrible spot. I think Jones got this to fourth-and-1 but instead he was marked as having his foot out and Florida was given a fourth-and-4.
Again, that’s the officials’ fault. But then Florida got a delay of game while setting up for the field goal. Part of that is because Mullen was arguing with the official about the spot instead of getting his field goal unit onto the field.
But really the questionable part in all of this is not calling a timeout here. Yes, Florida was able to make the field goal. But not calling the timeout did two things. First, it moved Jace Christmann back 5-yards to make it a 51-yard field goal. But it also eliminated any chance that the replay official would call for a review.
Maybe that wouldn’t have happened, but I suspect had there been 60 seconds for ESPN to run a couple of replays that the booth would have initiated a review. And even if they didn’t – you don’t want to challenge as you only get one per game – it still would have improved the odds of making the field goal significantly.
I wouldn’t be that hard on Mullen for not calling that timeout had he not just absolutely botched the end of the first half and gone into halftime with three timeouts left.
Kentucky took over with 5:15 in the first half and Florida forced them to punt. Zachary Carter sacked Will Levis with 2:42 left at the Kentucky 40-yard line. Mullen didn’t call a timeout.
Kentucky bled the clock to 1:56 before punting the ball, pinning Florida back at the 13-yard line. If you wanted to go into the locker room without being aggressive, this is where you run the ball. Instead, Mullen called a screen to Justin Shorter for two yards (no timeout), then called another pass play that turned into a first down to Trent Whittemore over the middle with 1:17 left. He then proceeded to run the ball twice and run out the clock.
I have no idea whether Florida could have scored, but the result isn’t really the point. I believe you should evaluate coaching based on the process of decision-making, and Mullen’s decision-making process here was abysmal. If you’re worried about getting pinned deep and giving the ball back to Kentucky, why are you throwing the ball?
And once you get that first first down, why then run the ball twice? It was a weird hedge where the first two plays of the drive were ultra-aggressive only to go ultra-conservative for the next two.
Finally, the game couldn’t end in any other way than Mullen’s coaching coup de gras, which is perhaps exemplified most in bullet form. Florida had first-and-goal at the Kentucky 9-yard line and the play sheet shows the following:
- Throw in flat to Gamble, -1 yard
- Run by Jones, +5 yards
- False Start, -5 yards
- Throw away, Facemask (Kentucky), +5 yards
- Wide receiver screen to Copeland (slips), -4 yards
- False Start, -5 yards
- Designed QB run (from 14), + 3 yards
- Throw in flat to Davis, + 3 yards
- Throw to Whittemore, incomplete
Notice anything about those plays? The only one that was a shot at the end zone was the final play. In fact, Florida was in the red zone twice in the final two drives and only took two shots at the end zone total.
Look, I get it. Emory Jones is a limited player. We can all see it. Mullen clearly sees it, and he didn’t trust Jones enough to let him air the ball out when it was critical. But Will Levis is no great shakes either. Yet the play after Emory Jones’ interception in the fourth quarter, Kentucky immediately went deep to Wan’Dale Robinson.
That play was well guarded by Florida, but it tracked with Stoops’ attitude the entire game. I opened this article talking about him putting the ball in Levis’ hands while trying to run out the clock, but he also went for it on fourth-and-2 from the Florida 34 to open the fourth quarter.
That play was also unsuccessful as the Gators defense bowed up and stopped Rodriguez running the ball out of the Wildcat. But even though they fell short, there was no way Stoops was going to let Kentucky walk away from this game having said they played not to lose.
That kind of boldness is often rewarded. It says that you’re focusing on the right things. It also says that you trust your players to do their jobs, even if you know that the plays won’t always be successful.
The same can’t be said for Florida and Dan Mullen.
Emory Jones’ Play
In my preview, I wrote the following when suggesting that while he was improving, Emory Jones had not proven himself as a solid SEC starter just yet.
“Through four games, Emory Jones has attempted 9 passes that have traveled more than 20 yards in the air. He’s averaging 7.6 yards per attempt on those throws with a 22 percent completion rate.”
You can bet Kentucky knew that tendency as well. The play I showed above where they dropped the coverage on Copeland is a clear indicator as well, given that had they sent Copeland deep, Florida would have likely had a big play if they could have hit it.
But if you want to know where Kentucky won this game, that rests purely on taking away Jones’ running game, and it had a lot to do with the Wildcats’ scheme.
What I noticed after the Gators first touchdown drive (where Anthony Richardson had an 11-yard run and Dameon Pierce gashed Kentucky for two 13-yard runs) was that Kentucky shifted to setting up with its three down linemen right over the Gators interior offensive linemen. Those Wildcats defensive linemen deserve whatever game balls that Kentucky is giving out, because they dominated Florida’s offensive line.
On this particular play, defensive end Josh Paschal is able to shed Kemore Gamble’s block, driving Malik Davis back for a loss. What you notice though is if you look behind Paschal right as he’s making the tackle, Florida has the play blocked pretty well. Paschal’s individual effort is what prevents this from being a big play.
Having those linemen situated so narrowly on the inside freed up the linebackers on the outside to be able to tackle Jones.
You can see on this play what Kentucky was up to. They were willing to give Florida a few yards up the middle if their linemen got pushed back because they only really had four men in the box with the other two linebackers lined up outside. But what they did at the snap was send both safeties to the middle and those two linebackers on the outside stayed outside.
That means Jones couldn’t get outside on the read option. And Kentucky was winning enough up-front that he couldn’t just hand the ball off. The solution to this is to take the top off the defense (watch Copeland on this play, red arrow) and make them pay for having the safeties crash to the middle. But Florida never really made them pay.
Part of that is because Kentucky was winning up-front. But part of it is because they mixed up coverages as well.
I’m convinced Jones thought the threat of him running was going to hold Kentucky’s linebackers here. Instead, outside linebacker J.J. Weaver (#13) dropped into coverage and Jones threw right into it. Had he recognized that everyone but Kentucky’s four rushers dropped deep into a zone, he would have just dumped the ball off to Malik Davis to either get a first down or set up a third-and-short.
Instead, the result was a backbreaking interception that set up Kentucky for a touchdown that pushed the lead to 10 points.
Jones wasn’t terrible in this game. The turnover was a killer, but he graded as just slightly below average using Yards Above Replacement (-0.08) and average using a more traditional metric like QB rating (133.4), better than Levis by a considerable amount in both those metrics.
But either his inability or unwillingness to throw the ball deep is significantly hindering the offense. Kentucky did a bunch of things on defense that you can’t do if you respect the opposition’s ability to go deep. Indeed, on the rare occasions that Anthony Richardson came in the game, they got out of the 3-3-5 or 3-2-6 formations I showed above.
They knew that Richardson was apt to take a deep shot, and they weren’t going to let him be the one who plunged that dagger.
Takeaway
The entire coaching section of this article focused on process, and nowhere is the lack of a solid process evident with this Florida team than on special teams.
The blocked field goal obviously was the killer, but that just further illustrates that Florida doesn’t do any of those things under Mullen. Aside from a Tommy Townsend fake punt against Miami in 2019 and a kick return by Kadarius Toney against Kentucky last season, I’m at a loss when trying to think of a special teams play that actually has changed a game.
And this is the second loss this season where special teams have been directly responsible for the point differential.
The eight false start penalties fall in the process category as well. Mullen knew the noise was going to be crazy in this game. Yet after the 4th or 5th false start, he didn’t have any way to switch to a silent count? The disadvantage to that is the defensive line has an opportunity to get a better jump. But the advantage is that you’re not constantly turning third-and-3’s into third-and-8’s.
But perhaps the most frustrating part is that these sorts of losses are now becoming common enough that you can say they are expected. The losses in 2018 to Kentucky and Missouri (and what should have been a loss to South Carolina), the loss in 2020 to LSU and now this loss are all games where Florida should have won handily but instead went home with the loss. In fact, 2019 Kentucky might be on this list were it not for the gruesome injury to Feleipe Franks.
You could blame to losses in 2018 on the transition from Jim McElwain and Mullen not having “his guys” at the QB position. You could marvel at the 2019 comeback against Kentucky because Trask was ready and looked great. You could at least blame Todd Grantham for the LSU loss because the offense put up 34 points, 609 yards and nearly pulled it out.
But the thing is, the yardage battle in that game was 609-418 in Florida’s favor. The yardage tally in the loss to Alabama two weeks ago was 440-331 in Florida’s favor as well. Florida is actually 5-0 if they you measured success based on yardage.
But that’s not how the game works.
You actually have to do all of the little things right. Whether that’s penalties, turnovers, adjustments, or just being willing to throw the ball deep, those little things add up to losses if you just let them fester. The same could be said for all those small decisions that add up over time, whether it’s enabling a staff who recruits at a sub-elite level or keeping a defensive coordinator who scares you into being ultra-conservative.
Because Mullen can bristle at the suggestions he was outcoached, but Stoops came to this battle with a clear idea of how to neutralize what Florida likes to do and all Mullen could do was respond with his game plan from the 2018 Mississippi State game, except they already ran the Kodak play for a touchdown last week against Tennessee.
There was no creativity. No change of direction. No deep shots. No use of Anthony Richardson in the second half. Florida got the exact game they needed out of its defense – the game I didn’t think they had in them – and lost because they only scored 13 points because they went into an offensive shell.
That sounds a lot like the problem they’ve had in Athens that gave this award its name.
Congratulations Coach Mullen, winner of the Week 5 Kirby!
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