College Football, Florida Gators

Can Feleipe Franks be a top-tier QB in 2019?

Gators QB Feleipe Franks makes a throw against Michigan. (Image used under Creative Commons license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/) via MGoBlog.

The preseason magazines start coming out this week.

And with that comes discussion about which players are going to take big steps forward and where players rank at their position in the country. Nowhere is that more important than at QB, and nowhere are Florida fans perhaps more divided than knowing that the 2019 season depends on further improvement from Feleipe Franks.

Franks was pretty good in 2018, with a yards above replacement (YAR) of 0.19 and a QB rating of 143.4. It was certainly much better than his 2017 season where he was benched repeatedly for Luke Del Rio and Malik Zaire.

Advertisements

But if they are honest, Gators fans have to admit that they aren’t quite sure what the team will get from Franks in 2019.

On one hand is the QB who finished the 2018 season really strong in the second half against South Carolina, Florida State and Michigan. But that same QB who caught fire towards the end of the year played poorly against Georgia and was benched the following week against Missouri.

So were the last few games of the season a mirage? Or is there reason to believe that Franks turned a corner and will be that QB the entire season in 2019?

Franks in wins and losses

I went back and charted every offensive play of the Gators 2018 season to see if there were any clues to whether Franks turned a corner late in the year.

What I was particularly interested in was Franks’ accuracy as he progressed from throwing screens behind the line of scrimmage versus going downfield, and whether that correlated to winning and losing. To do that, I charted each throw and how far past the line of scrimmage it was. Note that if Franks threw the ball away, I took the nearest receiver as the attempted yardage.

Gators QB Feleipe Franks’ accuracy at different throw depths in 2018. (Will Miles/Read and Reaction)

The first thing you’ll notice is that Franks got less accurate as he went downfield. This isn’t surprising and happens with most QBs. What really surprised me was where else he got inaccurate in losses compared to wins.

Franks was 16 percent less accurate on throws behind the line of scrimmage in losses. The result was that Florida only averaged 3.3 yards per attempt on those bubble screens in losses versus 7.7 yards per attempt in wins. That means that the offense was facing a second-and-7 in its three losses versus a second-and-2 in wins.

When you go back and look at the film, what you see is that in those games, the opponent really crowded the line of scrimmage and challenged the bubble screens Franks was throwing.

On this play, you can see the Missouri corner playing up tight against Josh Hammond. The screen pass is incomplete behind the line of scrimmage, but had Hammond caught the ball it would have been a loss on the play.

The response when the defense starts playing tight to the line is to start throwing downfield more. The problem is that Franks wasn’t accurate enough on those throws to make the defense pay. He only completed 24 percent of his throws between 10-19 yards and only 15 percent of his throws over 20 yards in the Gators three losses.

The result was that Florida averaged less than five yards per attempt on anything downfield in those games versus 9.5 yards per attempt on intermediate throws and 15.5 yards per attempt on deep throws in wins.

And this is where Gators fans can get encouragement from the way Franks finished the year. In the last three games versus FBS opponents (excluding Idaho), Franks completed over 50 percent of his passes at both the intermediate and deep depths.

I’ve written plenty about how explosive plays (20+ yards) are necessary to consistently score points. If you want to know why Florida ran away from FSU and Michigan, look no further than Franks ability to throw downfield.

Against Michigan, Franks completed passes of 41, 31, 30 and 28 yards. Against FSU, he completed passes of 54, 39, 38, 22 and 20 yards. Those nine throws (out of 49 total attempts) accounted for 71 percent of Franks passing yardage.

Against South Carolina, Franks didn’t have an explosive play through the air. Against Kentucky, Mississippi State, Georgia and Missouri he had one. He had two against Colorado State and Vandy, but one against the Commodores was a short pass that Van Jefferson took to the house. He had three against LSU and Tennessee.

Basically, his performance against FSU and Michigan was different from the way he had executed throughout the year. And against South Carolina, he was 0-2 on throws 10+ yards past the line of scrimmage in the first half. But in the second half, he was 4-5.

Combined with his performances against FSU and Michigan, from halftime of the South Carolina game on, Franks completed 15 of 26 for 395 yards (15.2 yards per attempt) on throws 10+ yards.

It really does look like he turned a corner.

Why did Franks turn that corner?

So the question is, why did Franks improve those last three games and can he maintain that performance going into 2019? I think the answer is yes, and would point towards two specific things as my reasons why.

Feleipe Franks’ throw depth percentage overall, in wins, in losses and in the last three games vs. FBS opponents. (Will Miles/Read and Reaction)

This chart reflects Dan Mullen’s play calling with Franks under center. What you’ll note is that in losses, Franks was asked to throw 10-19 yards downfield 31 percent of the time compared to 20 percent in wins. He also only threw in the 1-9 yards distance 30 percent of the time in losses versus 37 percent in wins.

Defenses started taking away some of the short outside throws that Franks liked to make, leaving him with intermediate throws where he struggled.

I’ve only included stats from the last three games against FBS opponents because a lot of people dismiss the Idaho game because the Vandals were an overmatched opponent. To some extent, that is true.

But that Idaho game also gave a clue to how Mullen might change the playcalling to help his QB with easier throws. In my preview of last year’s Florida State game, I noted that Mullen repeatedly had Franks throw over the middle against Idaho in preparation for a weakness in Florida State’s defense.

On this play, Franks executes the play-fake and then waits for tight end C’yontai Lewis to clear the linebacker. He then delivers the ball before the safety can get there. Note where the throw is: 8 yards past the line of scrimmage.

It’s not a coincidence that these sorts of throws over the middle were used much more often later in the season. Sometimes it was to get a key first down.

Sometimes it was for a bigger play and the throw went further downfield.

 

There are two common themes with these throws. First, they are over the middle (i.e. they don’t have to go as far from Franks to the receiver as a throw outside the hash marks). Second, they are both to his right side.

And that second part is the other reason I think that Franks turned a corner late in the season. When you look back at the film, you see something really glaring. When the receiver is on the left side of the formation to start a play, this is the kind of thing that happens.

Franks is really inaccurate when going left. Even when he has an opportunity to set his feet and turn his body, the ball is often short. If he tries to correct for this and puts too much on it, the ball sails and he overthrows his receiver (see, the opening play against Georgia).

So I already showed the throws over the middle and to receivers on the right hand side of the formation against FSU. But did Mullen go to that well against Michigan too?

These are the two plays after Chase Winovich blasted through the right side of the Gators offensive line and Gator chomped after a tackle. These two throws set up the reverse to Kadarius Toney on fourth down that set up the TD to put Florida up 20-10.

And finally, when it was time to put their foot on Michigan’s jugular, Franks went to the well one more time.

By most measures, this is a poor decision. The safeties drop straight back, meaning that anyone coming over the middle will be double-covered. But Franks places the throw perfectly over the corner and under the safety to a receiver from the right side of the formation.

This was on third-and-12. Five plays later, Florida was up 27-10 and the blowout was on.

This isn’t an isolated incident when you’re watching back through the 2018 season. Franks was inaccurate consistently on throws to his left and far more accurate on throws to his right down the field. He was really accurate on throws in between the hash marks to receivers coming from his right side.

Mullen went to plays that accentuated those strengths late in the season and I believe that is why Franks was able to complete over 50 percent of his passes 10+ yards down the field in the last three games (versus 34 percent prior).

Takeaway

Were I Miami’s defensive coordinator, I’d challenge Florida’s offense to do two things. First, I’d bring my corners up tight and take away the quick throws to the outside. Second, I’d play a “Tampa Two” coverage with my linebackers dropping back into the middle of the field to force Franks to throw the ball with touch over those linebackers if he wants to throw down the middle.

The Gators running game last season prevented that scheme because the linebackers had to come up and respect the run. Thus, without any improvement from Franks, the inexperience on the offensive line (and the effect it has on the success of the running game) may make it look like Franks has regressed.

However, Mullen also had a counter for that against Michigan.

Advertisements

Instead of throwing bubble screens to the wide receivers, Mullen split running back Lamical Perine out wide and behind the line of scrimmage. Because he was guarded by a linebacker or safety, and because he was behind the line, there was plenty of room for the screen to work.

Mullen will now have had an entire offseason to scheme around what he now knows Franks does well. To me, that means that the blocking of Kyle Pitts is going to be key.

If opponents have to respect Pitts’ ability to block, then they’ll have to put a base defense on the field when Florida puts him out there as a tight end. Then look for Mullen to split both Perine and Pitts out wide to open up those bubble screens further.

And that likely will be the story for 2019. If Franks doesn’t improve at all, his numbers will be slightly better because his coach has shown an ability to put him in the right position to succeed.

But if Franks can improve his accuracy downfield, particularly to his left hand side, he is going to take a major step forward.

FEATURED IMAGE USED VIA CREATIVE COMMONSLICENSE COURTESY MGOBLOG

7 Comments

  1. CGator

    Fascinating analysis; as more than even a causal fan, I never notice this depth of detail. On the one hand, the inability to throw to the left looks like a fatal flaw, as well as the dependence on the screens, but seeing how Mullen gameplays around that is also fascinating. Great article.

  2. Ken Clarke

    Great stuff. I had not recognized Franks’ weakness when throwing to the left. Curious, isn’t it?

  3. Nick Natalino

    Great stuff as usual. Looking forward to the next podcast.

  4. Jack Varney

    I would suggest that an analysis of the time Franks has to throw from the early season to the late might be informative. How many hurries, how many crowded pockets, and, of course how many sacks.

  5. Mike

    Really good stuff, however I would say a blanket statement that Franks is inaccurate throwing to his left isn’t true. Against Michigan (to Jefferson) and LSU (to Hammond x2) he throws absolute dimes to the left side.

    Overall good stuff. Go Gators!

  6. Chris

    Thanks for putting this together, Will. I love these analyses. I’d be curious about the defensive side of the ball, especially along the front 7. How do you see those position groups shaping up in 2019?

  7. Eric

    Very interesting. Great job! Mullen needs to hire you as a “special assistant” to break down other teams. Maybe he already has. Lol.